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ABSTRACT
Myopia is increasingly believed to be a significant determinant of behavior and also plays a central
role in justifications for social security and policies toward the taxation of capital.  It is important,
however, to account for labor supply effects, particularly in light of the preexisting distortion due
to labor income taxation.  For example, might even actuarially fair social security have the highly
distortionary effect of a tax on top of an existing tax (the income tax) because myopic individuals
give excessive weight to present levies on earnings that finance distant future benefits?  Similarly,
might greater reliance on capital rather than labor income taxation be attractive because collections
are in the future rather than when earnings are received?  To answer these and other questions, this
article analyzes the effect of such policies on labor supply in a model that explicitly incorporates
myopic decision-making.  Many of the results may seem counterintuitive.  In most respects, even
with myopia, social security has qualitatively different effects than those of a tax levied on top of an
existing tax.  Both social security and capital taxation may cause labor supply to rise or fall when
individuals  are  myopic,  depending  on  the  curvature  of  individuals’  utility  as  a  function  of
consumption.  Moreover, whatever is the sign of these effects under one assumption about how
myopia relates to labor supply decisions, the sign is reversed under the other assumption that is
considered.  Additionally, some interventions have a first-order effect on labor supply from the







moverholt@law.harvard.edu1See, for example, Kotlikoff, Spivak, and Summers (1982), Banks, Blundell, and Tanner
(1998), Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999), Moore and Mitchell (2000), Bernheim, Skinner, and
Weinberg (2001), Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2004), and Aguiar and Hurst (2005).
2No attempt is made here to undertake a complete welfare analysis of any particular
policy.  In order to do that, one could first examine the welfare effects of a policy ignoring
changes in labor supply and then supplement the analysis accordingly.  Importantly, labor supply
affects government revenue because the existence of an income tax; in standard optimization
problems, this welfare effect would be determined, at the margin, by the product of the rate of
change in revenue (equal to the rate of change in labor supply times the pertinent marginal tax
rate) and the shadow price on the government’s revenue constraint.  The present article’s focus




Economists have long been interested in the possibility that individuals may behave
myopically.  See, for example, Strotz (1956).  Increasingly in the past decade, researchers have
emphasized myopia as an explanation for savings behavior, including notably those features that
have been difficult to reconcile with idealized models of lifecycle maximization.  See, for
example, Laibson (1996, 1997) and the surveys by Bernheim (2002) and Bernheim and Rangel
(2005).  Empirical work has focused on such subjects as whether individuals’ retirement savings
are adequate and, relatedly, the existence of and explanation for a significant drop in
consumption upon retirement.
1
It is also appreciated that myopic savings behavior may have normative implications. 
Laibson (1996) estimates that correctives for inadequate savings due to myopia could raise
individuals’ lifetime welfare to an extent equivalent to almost an additional year’s worth of
income.  Social insurance and tax provisions for retirement savings seem motivated in part by the
concern that shortsighted individuals may inadequately provide for themselves.  Accordingly,
economists’ recently increased attention to social security and longstanding interest in optimal
capital taxation should be extended to incorporate myopic behavior.
The present study pursues such an inquiry with an emphasis on the implications of
myopic savings behavior for labor supply.
2  The subject of labor supply is significant in itself and
is especially important in light of the preexisting distortion due to labor income taxation. 
Although labor supply in general – and how it may be affected by social security and capital
taxation – has been studied extensively, it is important to consider how the analysis changes if it
is assumed that savings decisions are myopic.
Regarding social security, if mandatory contributions, typically a function of labor
income, are viewed by individuals as an additional tax, labor supply effects should be highly
significant because payroll taxes that fund social insurance are of a similar order of magnitude to
income taxes.  Following the rule of thumb that distortion is proportional to the square of the tax
rate, the total distortion would quadruple.  Furthermore, even an actuarially fair social security3Prior work that examines aspects of the interaction between social security and labor
supply – much based on the absence of perfect tax-benefit linkage – includes Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987), Browning (1985), Burkhauser and Turner (1978, 1985), Gordon (1983), and
Moffitt (1987).  See also Diamond and Köszegi (2003) on myopia and retirement and Feldstein
(1985) on myopia, social security, and savings.
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retirement scheme, not in itself a tax, might be imagined to have similar effects to a current tax
on labor if individuals are significantly myopic, for the contributions are extracted from earnings
in the present whereas the benefits they finance are in the distant future.  Although prior
theoretical literature, such as Diamond and Mirrlees (1978, 1986, 2007), has examined a number
of respects in which social security may influence retirement decisions, labor supply during
working years has received more limited scrutiny.  See, for example, Diamond (2002) and the
survey by Feldstein and Liebman (2002).
3  In particular, it has not been systematically analyzed
for the case in which individuals are myopic.  Yet this case is a natural one to consider in light of
the fact that myopia is thought to provide one of the most important justifications for the
existence of social security.
Regarding the taxation of capital, it is understood that such taxation serves indirectly as a
tax on labor and thus contributes to the distortion of labor supply.  To hold the overall level of
taxation on labor supply constant, one can examine capital taxation as a form of differential
commodity taxation, where different commodities correspond to consumption in different time
periods.  Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) showed that, in the presence of an optimal income tax, no
differential taxation is optimal when commodities as a whole are weakly separable from labor,
with the implication that capital should not be taxed.  However, taxes on capital – or,
equivalently, differential taxes on future consumption – are ordinarily levied in the future, raising
the possibility that they may have less of an effect on the current labor supply of myopic
individuals.  Perhaps deferred taxation generally, whether substituting a cash-flow consumption
tax for a tax on wages as earned or shifting from the taxation of earnings to the taxation of
capital, would have a favorable effect on labor supply when individuals are myopic.  Relatedly,
perhaps the subsidization of capital income, which may otherwise appear attractive as a
counterweight to myopic savings decisions, will have an offsetting cost of increasing labor
supply distortion.  To determine whether these and other conjectures are valid, it is necessary to
revisit prior analysis of capital taxation, incorporating myopia explicitly.
This article analyzes the effects of social security and capital taxation (or subsidization)
on labor supply in a setting in which individuals’ consumption allocation decisions are myopic. 
Because this is a preliminary investigation of a complex problem, it will focus on a fairly simple
model that highlights central issues but abstracts from a number of complications.  Accordingly,
the analysis will employ a standard two-period model with separable utility, wherein individuals
make only two decisions: how much labor to supply in the first period and how to allocate
disposable income between the two periods.  Individuals will be subject to a linear income tax on
their earnings and also to a social security regime in the first variation and to a tax or subsidy on
capital income (modeled as a differential tax on consumption in the two periods) in the second
variation.  Consumption decisions are assumed to exhibit a simple form of myopia wherein- 3 -
excessive weight is placed on first-period consumption.  For labor supply, two cases are
considered: when labor supply decisions exhibit the same myopia as consumption decisions, and
when labor supply decisions are nonmyopic but are made with an awareness that consumption
will be allocated myopically.
Section 2 examines social security.  To isolate the effects of myopia, actuarially fair
schemes are considered.  Given individuals’ myopic consumption decisions, the direct effect of
social security’s forced-savings feature is to raise welfare.  When labor supply decisions are
myopic, social security may raise or reduce labor supply, depending on the curvature of
individuals’ utility functions: Labor supply falls on account of social security reducing myopic
individuals’ perceived value of disposable income, but it rises because of the relatively greater
effect of social security on the perceived marginal utility of consumption in the first period. 
Importantly, as the forced-savings constraint just begins to bind, there is no first-order effect on
labor supply, even though there is a first-order welfare gain in improved consumption allocation. 
In this respect, despite the existence of even significant myopia, the social security “tax” does not
behave as a tax imposed on top of a preexisting tax (the linear labor income tax in this model): 
A small pure additional tax, unlike the social security tax here, would have a first-order effect on
labor supply and thus on distortion.
Moving to the case in which individuals’ labor supply decisions are nonmyopic, the sign
of the effect of social security on labor supply reverses.  That is, in cases in which the effect on
labor supply is negative (positive) with myopic labor supply, it is positive (negative) with
nonmyopic labor supply.  This difference results because nonmyopic individuals view social
security’s forced savings positively, which reverses both the direct effect of social security on the
value of consumption and the indirect effect on marginal utilities of consumption in the two
periods, as will be explained.  Additionally, in this case there is a first-order effect of social
security on labor supply as the forced-savings constraint just begins to bind, but one that falls as
the constraint becomes tighter.  Once again, the effect of social security is qualitatively different
from that of a tax upon a tax.
Section 3 analyzes the taxation of capital.  As noted, capital taxation or subsidization is
modeled as a differential tax on consumption in the two periods.  Furthermore, to abstract from
changes in the level of taxation, it is assumed that, when the tax on second-period consumption is
increased (reduced), the tax on first-period consumption is reduced (increased) so that the same
amount of revenue is raised for a given amount of labor income.  It is first shown that, as one
would expect, capital subsidization opposes the effect of myopia on consumption allocations,
which raises welfare.  Regarding labor supply, the effects are analogous to those of social
security.  For myopic labor supply, there is no effect of capital taxation or subsidization on labor
supply at the point at which a differential is first introduced.  But with nonmyopic labor supply,
there is a first-order effect of the same sign and analogous magnitude to that arising under social
security’s forced savings.  This section also considers the implications of heterogeneity in
susceptibility to myopia.  Capital subsidization improves the welfare of the myopic by reducing
their intertemporal consumption misallocation but reduces the welfare of the nonmyopic by
distorting theirs.  Additionally, capital subsidization tends to redistribute from the myopic to the
nonmyopic (at each level of earnings), the desirability of which depends on the form of the social- 4 -
welfare function and on the curvature of individuals’ utility functions.
Section 4 examines the choice between social security and capital subsidization as
remedies for myopia and also considers the relevance of liquidity constraints to the analysis. 
Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
2.  Social Security
2.1.  Model
Consider a two-period model in which individuals supply labor, l, in the first period at the
wage w and allocate disposable income between consumption, c1 and c2, in periods 1 and 2. 
Suppose that utility takes the following form:


















where ￿ is the subjective discount factor and z measures the disutility of labor effort, with z￿ > 0
and z￿ > 0.  (To clarify, ￿ is taken here to be a real trait of individuals’ utility, for purposes of
assessing social welfare; myopia will be introduced separately below.)  The positive constant ￿ is
the coefficient of relative risk aversion, utility from consumption in each period taking the
constant-relative-risk-aversion form (where it is understood that, when ￿ = 1, utility from
consumption ci is instead given by ln ci).  This functional form further implies that there is a
constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption.  Individuals are assumed to be
subject to a linear income tax with marginal rate t and grant g, and savings earn interest at the
rate r, so their budget constraint (before we consider social security or capital taxation) is
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The first-order condition for consumption allocation between the two periods by a nonmyopic
individual (which can be determined by solving the budget constraint (2) for c2, substituting it
into expression (1), and differentiating) is
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Let c1* denote the optimal level of first-period consumption by a nonmyopic individual (which
can be stated explicitly by simultaneously solving expressions (2) and (3) for c1 and c2).
To introduce myopia in a simple manner, suppose that, in allocating disposable income4It would also be natural to weight the disutility of labor, z, by ￿ because labor is supplied
in the first period.  Including such a weight would not materially affect the results below. 
(Specifically, each of the z￿ and z￿ terms in expressions (7), (8), (19), (24), and (25), involving
the cases with myopic labor supply, would be weighted by ￿, but the ultimate expressions of
interest would be unchanged because this added weight would implicitly be in d
2u/dl
2 in the
denominator of expressions  (9), (10), (28), and (29).)  Note also that, instead of weighting first-
period sources of utility by ￿, one could weight second-period utility from consumption by a
fraction less than one.  The results would be nearly identical, the difference between the two
formulations being in the cardinalization of utility as function of consumption.  (Recall that the
discount factor ￿ does not already reflect such a downward weighting of second-period
consumption because ￿ is taken to be the true subjective discount rate, a feature of the
normatively relevant utility function.)
5As has become familiar, myopia is being taken as a problem of self-control rather than as
a feature of true utility (the latter being captured here by ￿).
6In the presence of a tax on labor income, the assumption that social security is actuarially
fair is primarily a matter of notational convenience, for any difference between taxes and
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between c1 and c2, individuals behave as if they are maximizing the following variant of the
utility function given by expression (1):




















where the weight on first-period consumption ￿ is taken to exceed 1.
4  This formulation could be
taken to represent quasi-hyperbolic discounting, as in Laibson (1996, 1997), for the case of a
two-period model, or other forms of myopia.  The important point is that individuals’ behavior is
dictated by a different utility function (4) from that which defines their actual well-being (1), i.e.,
that which is relevant for assessing social welfare.
5  The first-order condition for consumption
allocation by a myopic individual is
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M denote the optimal level of first-period consumption by a myopic individual.  Comparing
expressions (3) and (5), it is clear that ￿ > 1 implies c1
M > c1*.
At this point, social security can be introduced into the model.  This could be done fairly
generally by letting T
S(wl) denote the social security tax on labor earnings that individuals are
required to pay in period 1 and B
S(wl) as the level of social security benefits they receive in
period 2, where benefits depend in some fashion on prior contributions.  In order to isolate the
effects of the forced-savings feature of social security from redistributive and revenue effects, it
will be assumed that social security is actuarially fair, i.e., T
S(wl)(1+r) = B
S(wl) for all wl.
6  Inexpected benefits at a given income level could instead be understood as a component of the
labor income tax.
7Other formulations of social security could be analyzed, including one in which the
bound is a fraction of earnings, wl, and another in which the bound is a fraction of after-tax
earnings, (1￿t)wl (which differ from disposable income on account of g).  For any given tax rate
t, these two formulations are equivalent to each other, and the effect of changing the bound
differs between the two cases only in magnitude because raising the latter bound (on after-tax
earnings) one unit has a smaller effect than raising the former bound (on before-tax earnings)
when t > 0.  Analysis of these two cases yields results qualitatively similar to those of the case
considered in the text.  Note that including g in the quantity that is subject to forced savings, as is
done here, has the effect that forced savings are a constant fraction of disposable income at all
income levels, whereas the other formulations would make forced savings a rising fraction of
disposable income (because the grant g, exempt from the forced-savings requirement in the
alternative formulations, is a greater share of disposable income for lower-income individuals). 
Alternatively, if the grant payment was divided between the two periods (and borrowing against
it was impossible), these two alternative models would be even closer to the present model.
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that case, social security would have no effect on the budget constraint (2), and thus on behavior,
if individuals could freely borrow against (period 2) social security benefits and, furthermore, if
despite their myopia they fully appreciated the availability of such benefits and had no
compunction against borrowing.  Thus, social security is only interesting when such borrowing is
impossible or otherwise will not occur, as will be assumed throughout.
Accordingly, the (only) effect of social security in the present model is to constrain the
amount individuals can consume in period 1.  For convenience, this upper bound on c1 will be
stated as a fraction of disposable income, so social security policy may be described simply yet
completely by ￿, the minimum required fraction of savings.
7  There is now the additional
constraint
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) . 6 1 1 1 c t wl g £ - - + c
If the constraint is binding, this expression is satisfied as an equality, which in turn for any given
level of l dictates the allocation of disposable income between c1 and c2.
If labor supply was unaffected by social security, welfare analysis would be
straightforward.  Raising ￿ has no effect until the point at which the constraint (6) begins to bind,
i.e., the point at which the level of c1 that satisfies (6) as an equality just equals c1
M.  As ￿ is
raised further, c1 will fall.  This initially produces a first-order welfare gain because c1
M > c1*, and
raising ￿ continues to produce such a gain until c1 just equals c1*.  (The value of ￿u/￿c1 given by
expression (3) is negative when c1 > c1*.)  In this respect, the forced savings that results from
social security can be viewed as a substitute for a commitment technology that myopic8For individuals who already can commit to lower levels of c1, social security would have
no effect until the constraint began to bind on them, i.e., until first-period consumption is forced
lower than the level to which they can successfully commit themselves.  For simplicity, it is
assumed that no private commitment technologies exist.
9For example, some individuals employ commitment devices (automatic contributions to
retirement accounts, not purchasing types of food they know they will overeat), many fail to
borrow (fully or at all) from increased home equity despite their tendency to consume all of their
paychecks, and savings behavior may be influenced by modest changes in framing, such as when
individuals’ contributions to 401(k) plans depend on what contribution, if any, is specified as the
default.  On the latter, see Madrian and Shea (2001) and Choi et al. (2004).
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individuals would employ to reduce their level of c1 if they had the ability to do so.
8
In subsequent discussion, attention will largely be confined to levels of ￿ sufficiently high
that the constraint binds (for lower values of ￿, since there is no effect on consumption, there can
be no effect on labor supply) but not so high as to force c1 below c1*.  The question to be
explored is whether the effect of raising ￿ on labor supply reinforces or detracts from (or has no
effect on) the welfare gains from forced savings in reallocating consumption between the two
periods.
Two subcases regarding the effects of social security on labor supply should be
distinguished: When individuals’ labor supply decisions are subject to the same myopia that
determines the allocation of consumption between periods, and when these decisions are rational
in the sense that individuals not only understand that they will allocate their earnings myopically
but also appreciate what their realized utility actually will be (i.e., that such an allocation
involves too high a level of c1).  Both cases are of potential interest in light of the fact that
myopic behavior is not that well understood and the recognition that myopia is context specific.
9 
Note specifically that the effect of myopia on labor supply may depend on the nature of the
decision in question: Decisions about whether to pursue higher education or what job to choose
from among many that require different effort levels may perhaps be made nonmyopically,
whereas the same individuals may forgo overtime opportunities because of the immediate
temptation to go out with friends or home to watch favorite television shows.  For simplicity,
analysis will focus on the two pure cases, beginning with that in which the same behavioral
utility function (4) determines both consumption allocation and labor supply.
2.2.  Myopic Labor Supply
As stated, the present assumption is that individuals’ labor supply decision is also myopic
in the sense that it is determined by maximizing utility as defined in expression (4) rather than as
defined in expression (1).  It should be emphasized that individuals are nevertheless assumed to
appreciate that their consumption allocations are myopic in the same sense.  In some respects,
this assumption seem natural; one might say that such myopic individuals only know of one
utility function in period 1, and that is the myopic one.  In addition, it is the only case of
analytical interest because otherwise individuals would not expect social security to be binding10To state that there is no analytical interest in the alternative assumption that
consumption myopia is unanticipated does not mean that it could not be of practical interest.  If
individuals did behave in this alternative manner, social security would raise welfare through
improved consumption allocation, and no further analysis would be required to take into account
effects on labor supply.
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on themselves and thus there would be no effect on labor supply (keeping in mind that attention
is focused on the case in which ￿ is not set so high as to force c1 below c1*).
10
When the forced-savings constraint is binding, expression (6), holding as an equality,
determines c1 as a function of l.  The value of c2 as a function of l can be determined by
substituting for c1 in the budget constraint (2), yielding c2 = ￿[(1￿t)wl+g](1+r).  The first-order
condition for labor supply in this case is
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) . 7 1 1 1 1 0 1 2
du
dl
c t w r c t w z = - - + + - - ¢ =
- - b c d c
r r
(Throughout, primes denote derivatives.)  Differentiating this expression with respect to ￿ and
rearranging terms yields
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where l￿ denotes dl/d￿.  Observe first that each term in braces in the numerator reduces to 1￿￿
because ci
￿1 is followed by the expression for the respective ci.  When this common term is
factored, what remains is equal to (￿u/￿c1)
M, the partial derivative of utility with respect to c1 for
myopic individuals, as indicated by expression (5).  Finally, the denominator can be shown to be
equal to d
2u/dl
2 (from differentiating expression (7), i.e., for the present case of myopic labor
supply).  Accordingly, expression (8) simplifies to
( )












To interpret this expression, note first that the denominator must be negative at the
individual’s optimum (and it can readily be shown to be strictly negative for all l in any event). 
Second, observe that the presence of the term (￿u/￿c1)
M in the numerator indicates that, as the
constraint just begins to bind, the effect on labor supply (in whichever direction it may be) will
be negligible.  This result indicates that an actuarially fair tax on present disposable income to11Formally, this condition and analysis are close to what would be applicable if one were
addressing the question of how generous should be allocations of social resources to a two-
person family when the two family members do not share the resources equally.  This
coincidence should not be surprising.  After all, with myopia, it is often stated that individuals
behave as if there are two selves, see, for example, Thaler and Shefrin (1981); in the case of
unequal sharing in the family, there literally are two persons, one of which is given less weight
than the other.
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finance forced savings does not effect labor supply in a manner qualitatively or (in general)
quantitatively similar to that of further raising the marginal tax rate on current earnings, even
though individuals are assumed to be myopic.
As the constraint becomes tighter (as ￿ increases once the constraint binds), (￿u/￿c1)
M
becomes (more) positive.  The reason is that this derivative reflects myopic individuals’
perceived marginal utility from raising c1 rather than their actual marginal utility.  When the
social security forced-savings constraint is binding, c1 is less than what myopic individuals would
choose, so the perceived marginal utility of raising c1 further would be positive.  Accordingly, l￿
is negative (positive) – i.e., tightening the forced-savings constraint reduces (increases) labor
supply – if ￿ < 1 (￿ > 1).
The intuition for this result can be understood by decomposing two effects (indicated by
the “1” and the “￿￿” in the leading term 1￿￿).  A direct effect arises from more forced savings. 
When labor supply decisions reflect the same myopia as do individuals’ first-period consumption
allocation decisions, forcing an incremental reallocation of consumption toward period 2 is
viewed as undesirable.  Hence, the perceived return to labor effort falls.
An indirect effect is due to changes in relative marginal utilities of consumption in the
two periods.  As ￿ is increased, the consumption reallocation toward period 2 changes the
marginal utility of consumption in each period, making it higher in period 1 and lower in period
2.  Because first-period rather than second-period consumption is perceived as too low, the
reallocation changes the (perceived) marginal utility of consumption more in the first period than
in the second.  (Stated precisely, the third derivative of utility as a function of consumption is
positive, so the magnitude of the second derivative is greater when consumption is (perceived to
be) low, as it is here in the first period, than when it is high, as in the second period.)  When
relative risk aversion is low, specifically, when ￿ < 1, this latter effect is less than the direct effect
due to consumption being perceived to be less well allocated between the two periods, so the
overall perceived marginal benefit of increasing labor effort falls.  However, when risk aversion
is high, ￿ > 1, the latter effect dominates, so labor effort rises.
11  In other words, when ￿ > 1, the
fact that social security makes earnings seem less attractive is outweighed by the fact that the
forced reduction in c1 greatly increases the perceived marginal value of first-period consumption,
which can only be raised, partially restoring it to its unconstrained level, by working more. 
When ￿ < 1, this latter effect is present but insufficient to outweigh the direct reduction in the
value of consumption.- 10 -
These results may be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1:  When individuals’ consumption allocation and labor supply decisions are
subject to myopia, the effect on labor supply of tightening the social security forced-savings
constraint is:
(a) zero as the constraint just begins to bind, but thereafter is nonzero (unless ￿ = 1) and
(b) negative, if ￿ < 1, and
(c) positive, if ￿ > 1.
Further illumination regarding the difference between the social security “tax” (i.e., the
amount paid in period 1, as a function of wl, to fund consumption in period 2) and the income tax
(also a positive function of wl) can be gleaned by comparing l￿ to lt.  For the latter, one can
differentiate expression (7) with respect to t, rearrange terms, and make some substitutions to
yield
[ ] [ ]
( )
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To compare lt to l￿, focus initially (and primarily) on how the first term in the numerator
on the right side of expression (10) compares to the numerator of the right side of expression (9). 
The term in brackets in the first term of (10) is positive, as is the value of (￿u/￿c1)
M in (9) (when
considering the range in which the constraint is binding).  Likewise, the leading factors both have
the term 1￿￿, so they also have the same sign.  However, the terms in brackets themselves are
quite different.  Raising t reduces consumption in both periods (by 1￿￿ and ￿ in periods 1 and 2,
respectively), whereas raising ￿ reduces consumption in the first period while raising it in the
second (see expression (5) for (￿u/￿c1)
M).  As noted when interpreting expression (9), the effect
of the latter is nil at the point at which the constraint just begins to bind, rising thereafter, so the
effect of the constraint is in this respect qualitatively different from that of a tax levied on top of
a tax.
Observe that this difference persists even when myopia is significant.  The reason is that
myopic individuals do not have a higher marginal utility in period 1 once they have optimally –
from their perspective – adjusted their levels of consumption.  At that point, they value
increments to c1 and to savings equally.  (Another distinction between lt and l￿ is due to the
second term in the numerator of expression (10), which has no corresponding component in
expression (9): Raising t pertains to only earned income and not the grant component g of the12As a result, there will be a range of ￿ somewhat in excess of one for which lt is negative
even though l￿ for the myopic case is positive.  See Chetty (forthcoming) on how unearned
income influences the values of ￿ for which labor supply is upward sloping.  Note that, in the
present problem, despite myopia, it can be shown that labor supply is affected analogously by
changing t and by changing w, just as in the standard problem – that is, lt = ￿wlw/(1￿t).
13As mentioned in the preceding case, one could also consider the possibility that myopia
is not anticipated when choosing labor supply, but then social security would have no effect on
labor supply because the constraint would not be expected to bind.
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linear income tax, so the income effect is adjusted accordingly.
12)  In conclusion:
Remark 1:  When individuals’ consumption allocation and labor supply decisions are
subject to myopia, the effect on labor supply of tightening the social security forced-savings
constraint is qualitatively different from that of increasing the existing income tax rate.
2.3.  Nonmyopic Labor Supply
Assume instead that individuals’ labor supply decisions are nonmyopic even though their
consumption decisions are myopic.  Specifically, suppose that individuals choose labor supply to
maximize utility as defined by expression (1) rather than expression (4), but these labor supply
decisions take into account that, when it comes time to decide upon consumption, the allocation
will be given by expression (5), except to the extent constrained by social security, expression
(6).
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The analysis of this case is straightforward from the above derivation, although the
conclusions differ.  The first-order condition for labor supply is now
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) . 11 1 1 1 1 0 1 2
du
dl
c t w r c t w z = - - + + - - ¢ =
- - r r c d c
This is identical to condition (7) for the case of myopic labor supply except that ￿ = 1. 
Differentiating this expression with respect to ￿, rearranging terms, and making analogous
substitutions to those used previously yields
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This condition is deceptively similar to expression (9) for the case of myopic labor supply, but it
is importantly different because, in the numerator, (￿u/￿c1)
M from expression (5) is replaced by
￿u/￿c1 from expression (3), i.e., the effect on nonmyopic utility from raising c1.  When
consumption decisions are anticipated to be myopic, and assuming that the social security
parameter ￿ is in the range in which there is still overconsumption in period 1, the value of ￿u/￿c1
is negative (whereas (￿u/￿c1)
M was positive) because, on account of myopia, c1 has been raised- 12 -
past the point at which the nonmyopic first-order condition for consumption is satisfied.
An immediate implication is that l￿ now has the same sign as 1￿￿, rather than the
opposite sign.  That is, as more savings are forced, labor supply will rise (fall) if ￿ is less
(greater) than 1.  As before, the phenomenon has two components.  First, when ￿ is increased,
earnings are better allocated, which encourages labor effort.  Because the labor supply decision is
taken to be rational, the value of social security – as a substitute device making it possible for
individuals de facto to commit to consume less – is positive in fact and is perceived as such.  On
the other hand, as ￿ is increased, the reduction in consumption misallocation changes the
marginal utility of consumption in each period, making it higher in period 1 and lower in period
2.  Because of the curvature of utility as a function of each period’s consumption, the latter effect
is greater.  When ￿ < 1, this latter effect is less than the direct effect due to consumption being
better allocated between the two periods, so the overall marginal benefit of increasing labor effort
rises.  However, when ￿ > 1, the latter effect dominates, so labor effort falls.
Another difference between the present case and that with myopic labor supply is that,
there, l￿ = 0 as the forced-savings constraint just began to bind, whereas here this is not true:  At
that point, the marginal gain from consumption reallocation toward the future, which is taken
into account in individuals’ labor supply decisions, is at its greatest, and thus forced savings
affects labor supply nontrivially (except when ￿ or ￿ is close to 1) from the moment the
constraint begins to bind.  This factor and, accordingly, the effect of forced savings on labor
supply will equal zero not when the constraint just begins to bind but rather when ￿ reaches the
point at which the magnitude of forced savings just equals its optimal (nonmyopic) level, i.e.,
when c1 =  c1*.  If ￿ were increased further, ￿u/￿c1 would reverse sign, becoming positive, and
the sign of l￿ would reverse from whatever it had been when ￿ was lower.  In this respect also,
forcing additional savings has a qualitatively different effect from that of raising the tax rate. 
(One can also, as above, compare l￿ to lt explicitly; here, lt is as given by expression (10) except
that ￿ = 1.  The comparison is qualitatively different because l￿ is qualitatively different.)
These results may be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2:  When individuals’ consumption allocation decisions are subject to
myopia but their labor supply decisions are not, the effect on labor supply of tightening the
social security forced-savings constraint is:
(a) nonzero (unless ￿ = 1) as the constraint just begins to bind and thereafter – until
consumption equals the nonmyopic optimum, at which point the effect is zero, after which it
reverses from what is described in (b) and (c) – and in this initial range is
(b) positive, if ￿ < 1, and
(c) negative, if ￿ > 1.
In addition, juxtaposing the results for the cases of myopic and nonmyopic labor supply
further reinforces the sense in which the effect of social security on labor supply differs from that
of raising the marginal tax rate t on labor income.  The fact that the sign of the effect on labor
supply from tightening the forced-savings constraint (whatever it might be) is opposite for14Of the two cases, social security is more tax-like when labor supply is myopic, for
individuals perceive its mandate to be undesirable, and increasingly so as its magnitude rises
(although, as noted previously, there are still substantial qualitative differences).
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myopic and nonmyopic labor supply decisions most clearly demonstrates that social security is
qualitatively different.  (Note that the reversal in sign applies independently to each of the two
effects, the direct effect on the value of consumption and the indirect effect due to the curvature
of the utility function.)  Additionally, in each case, the magnitude of the effect is determined
differently.  For myopic labor supply, the initial marginal effect is zero – whereas adding a small
ordinary tax on top of a preexisting tax has a first-order effect – and it grows in magnitude as the
constraint tightens.  For nonmyopic labor supply, the effect on labor supply (in whichever
direction) is initially first-order and tends to fall (rather than rising) as more savings is forced,
reaching zero when forced savings equal the nonmyopic savings optimum (after which the sign
of the effect reverses from whatever it was).
14
As previously noted, an important part of the explanation for these differences between
forced savings and taxation is that, even with significant myopia that leads to substantial
overallocation of disposable income to c1, the result of the misallocation is an increase in the
actual and perceived marginal utility of c2, sufficiently so that, at the unconstrained myopic
optimum, the individual is indifferent between reallocations of consumption between the two
periods.  Hence, forcibly reallocating some consumption to period 2 does not act at all like a tax,
at least initially, in the myopic labor supply case and is viewed as a benefit (rather than as a cost,
as with a tax) in the nonmyopic labor supply case.  Although these features change as the
constraint tightens, they do not immediately vanish.  In conclusion:
Remark 2:  When individuals’ consumption allocation decisions are subject to myopia
but their labor supply decisions are not, the effect on labor supply of tightening the social
security forced-savings constraint is qualitatively different from that of increasing the existing
income tax rate.
3.  Taxation of Capital Income
3.1.  Model
This section will analyze the same two-period model used in section 2 for purposes of
analyzing social security.  The only difference is that, instead of introducing a constraint (6) on
first-period consumption, differential commodity taxation will be examined.  As in standard
models of commodity taxation, suppose the government can impose a tax ￿i on each of the
commodities ci (corresponding to consumption in each period).  For convenience, let ￿i = 1+￿i
denote the full price facing consumers.  Accordingly, the budget constraint (2) can be rewritten as15In the present setting, analysis of further deviations would require recalibration of the
revenue-neutral tax adjustment (￿1￿) to account for the extent of the change in c1.
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Although it is conventional to think of a tax on capital income as applying to the interest rate r,
the present formulation is equivalent and eases exposition and interpretation.  (If the second term
on the left side of (13) was written instead as c2/[1+r(1￿￿r)], where ￿r is the tax rate on interest,
one can let ￿2 equal (1+r)/[1+r(1￿￿r)], which produces expression (13) as the budget constraint.)
Because we wish to focus on the effect of differential commodity taxation on
consumption, utility, and labor supply, abstracting from effects on the overall level of taxation
(revenue), it will be useful to consider a particular policy experiment: As ￿2 is increased, it is
assumed that ￿1 is decreased to keep the present value of revenue raised from commodity
taxation constant, under the hypothetical assumption that labor supply is unchanged.  (Instead of
adjusting ￿1, one could adjust t and derive analogous results, for it is familiar that changing the
overall level of commodity taxes – keeping consumer price ratios, here ￿1/￿2, constant – is
equivalent to changing the level of income taxation.  Holding t constant and making all the
adjustments through the ￿i’s has the virtue of keeping clear both that the overall level of taxation
is fixed and, relatedly, that the only change involves relative taxation of consumption in each
period.)
Furthermore, it will be convenient to follow the practice in much of the literature on
optimal commodity taxation by focusing on local effects, in particular, raising ￿2 from a starting
point at which ￿1 = ￿2 = 1.
15  Under these assumptions, to determine the required adjustment to
￿1, one can differentiate an expression for (the present value of) commodity tax revenue, which is
(￿1￿1)c1 + (￿2￿1)c2/(1+r), with respect to ￿2, set it equal to zero, and evaluate the result at












(Throughout this section, primes denote derivatives with respect to ￿2, except for z￿, where the
derivative as before is with respect to l.)
3.2.  Constant Labor Supply
The effect of social security on consumption in each period and thus on the welfare of
myopic individuals, ignoring effects on labor supply, was immediate.  Because the effect of
differential commodity taxation is not quite as straightforward and the details will prove useful
for subsequent analysis, we begin by examining explicitly the case in which labor supply is- 15 -
imagined to be held constant.
To determine the first-order condition for consumption by a myopic individual, we can
use the budget constraint (13) to solve for c2, which equals [(1￿t)wl+g￿￿1c1](1+r)/￿2, substitute
into expression (4) for perceived utility of the myopic consumer, and differentiate:
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This condition, in turn, can be differentiated with respect to ￿2:
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To simplify, use the fact that we are evaluating this derivative at ￿1 = ￿2 = 1, that ￿1￿ is given by
expression (14), that c2 is determined by the budget constraint (13), and make use of the first-

























As expected, c1￿ > 0, as the numerator and denominator of expression (17) are both positive (the
denominator is the negative of ￿u
2/￿c1
2).  Noting the existence of partially common factors and












As expression (18) indicates, c1 changes more in response to an increase in ￿2 the smaller
is the curvature of the utility function, indicated by ￿ (which, as noted, in this model is the
coefficient of constant relative risk aversion and also 1/￿ indicates the constant rate of
intertemporal substitution).  It is interesting to compare this effect to what might be called the
mechanical effect of increasing ￿2 on c1, i.e., the rate at which consumption of c1 would change if16Unlike in the case of social security, it would not be analytically trivial to consider the
alternative assumption that individuals are myopic when choosing labor supply but do not
anticipate being myopic when choosing consumption.  If one followed the subsequent derivations
mutatis mutandis, it would be seen that the same result obtains (in sharp contrast to the case with
social security).
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savings were held constant.  The higher tax in period 2 and lower tax in period 1 would, in this
respect, cause c2 to fall and c1 to increase, the latter at the rate of c2/(1+r).  Accordingly, c1￿
simply equals the mechanical effect divided by ￿.  When risk aversion (curvature) is low (below
1), individuals raise c1 by more than indicated by the mechanical effect – i.e., they reduce savings
– and when risk aversion is high (above 1), they raise c1 by less – i.e., they increase savings
(despite that fact that ￿2/￿1 is higher).
Consistent with intuition, when individuals are myopic, it is optimal to reduce ￿2 from its
benchmark level, i.e., to employ a capital subsidy, in order to induce a decrease in first-period
consumption, which is too high relative to what would be ideal according to the normative utility
function (1).  When capital is subsidized, individuals have fewer resources available in the first
period and more in the second, which mechanically produces the desired effect – i.e., it would
result even if individuals were unaware of the change and simply saved as they had previously. 
Under present assumptions, however, the increase in savings could be more or less, depending on
the curvature of utility with respect to consumption.  Next we examine how the desirability of
taxing or subsidizing capital in the present setting is influenced by labor supply effects.
3.3.  Myopic Labor Supply
Following the approach used when analyzing social security, it is now assumed that
individuals, in choosing labor supply, are maximizing myopic utility, expression (4), and that
they are aware that their consumption decisions are myopic as well.
16  The first-order condition
for labor supply in this case is
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To determine the dci/dl’s and for subsequent analysis, it is useful to introduce some
additional notation.  Let y = (1￿t)wl+g (disposable income, as given on the right side of the
budget constraint (13)), and let ￿ equal the right side of the latter expression in (15), which
implies that ￿ will also equal c1/c2.  One can solve expressions (13) and (15) simultaneously,




















































































Accordingly, expression (19) can be rewritten as
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(Recall that primes denote derivatives with respect to ￿2, except for z￿.)  Differentiation of
expressions (20) and (21) with respect to ￿2, making appropriate substitutions, allows one to












































Evaluating these expressions at ￿1 = ￿2 = 1, one can see that the second terms in each simply
indicate the effect of raising ￿2 when labor supply was held constant.  (For example, compare
expressions (26) and (18).)  The first terms depict the effect of raising ￿2 on labor supply
multiplied by the corresponding expenditure shares.









































The term in square brackets is simply the first-order condition for myopic individuals’
consumption allocation decisions, (￿u/￿c1)






































Because individuals’ first-order condition for consumption is satisfied, it follows that
= 0.  This result is as one would expect:  As one just begins to raise ￿2 (and lower ￿1 as lq2
indicated by expression (14)), starting from ￿1 = ￿2 = 1, the resulting change in the allocation of
consumption has no first-order effect on myopic individuals’ (perceived) utility; hence, the return
to labor effort is unaffected.  This result is analogous to that for social security when the
constraint just begins to bind.  (Compare expressions (29) and (9).)  Accordingly, we can state:
Proposition 3:  When individuals’ consumption allocation and labor supply decisions are
subject to myopia, raising the relative tax rate on second-period consumption (i.e., in a constant-
revenue manner) has no effect on labor supply at the point of no differential taxation.17If their myopic consumption choices were not anticipated, they would not find that a
small change in capital taxation had other than a second-order effect on their consumption
allocation, so labor supply would be unaffected, just as was the case with myopic labor supply.
18There are also ￿’s implicit elsewhere, in particular, in the definition of ￿; these remain
unaffected because they indicate consumption myopia.
19In expression (30), c2/￿(1+r) equals c1￿, as indicated by expression (18), reflecting the
fact that, when capital taxation is changed, individuals are induced to adjust consumption (to an
- 19 -
3.4.  Nonmyopic Labor Supply
As with social security, we now consider the case in which individuals’ labor supply
decisions are nonmyopic – they choose labor effort to maximize expression (1) rather than
expression (4) – even though their consumption choices are myopic, a fact that they anticipate.
17 
Analysis of this case closely parallels that for myopic labor supply.  Specifically, expressions
(19) through (28) would be unaltered except for the fact that the ￿’s in expressions (19), (24),
(25) and (28) would be replaced by 1’s.





































Expression (30) differs from expression (29) because we now have the nonmyopic
derivative of utility with respect to c1 in the numerator.  Because of myopia in the actual choice
of consumption, this derivative is negative (individuals’ initially are overconsuming in the first
period) – until c1 is reduced to c1*, but here we are only considering a marginal increase in ￿2. 
Because the denominator is also negative, the sign of  will be the same as that of ￿￿1.  The lq2
interpretation is the same as in the case of social security with nonmyopic labor supply.  The
direct effect of raising ￿2, i.e., of taxing capital (second-period consumption) is to worsen the
already distorted consumption allocation, which reduces the return to labor effort.  (This
corresponds to the “￿1” in ￿￿1.)  The indirect effect is that, as the distortion worsens, there is a
further drop in the marginal utility of first-period consumption and rise in the marginal utility of
second period consumption.  The latter effect is larger and, if ￿ > 1, exceeds the direct effect,
causing labor supply to rise.
If differential commodity taxation is to be employed as a partial remedy for myopia, a
capital subsidy would be contemplated, as discussed in subsection 3.2.  This would increase
labor supply when ￿ < 1 and decrease labor supply when ￿ > 1.  This is the same result as with
tightening the social security constraint in the case of nonmyopic labor supply.  Indeed, a
comparison of expressions (30) and (12) indicates that they are nearly identical.  The opposite
signs are due to the fact that raising social security contribution requirements (raising ￿) reduces
c1 whereas raising ￿2 increases c1.  The other differences in the numerator reflect different scaling
due to the differences in the policy experiments.
19  Therefore, we have:extent that depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the level of consumption
subject to tax).  The only other difference between expressions (30) and (12) is the y in the
denominator of the numerator in expression (30).  This reflects that ￿, the forced-savings
minimum for social security, is applied to income as a whole; see expression (6).
20An increase in capital subsidization that was designed to keep each group’s tax
payments constant (rather than merely the total) would involve a relative tax on the nonmyopic
and transfer to the myopic because, ceteris paribus, the nonmyopic benefit more from subsidizing
second-period consumption since theirs is greater.  The simple increase in capital subsidization
examined here can be understood as the combination of such a compensated increase and a direct
(income-level-specific) transfer from the myopic to the nonmyopic.  This feature explains the
social welfare relevance of the heuristic arguments in the text that follows; as mentioned in note
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Proposition 4:  When individuals’ consumption allocation decisions are subject to
myopia but their labor supply decisions are not, raising the relative tax rate on second-period
consumption (i.e., in a constant-revenue manner) has a nonzero effect on labor supply (unless
￿ = 1) at the point of no differential taxation, which is
(a) negative, if ￿ < 1, and
(b) positive, if ￿ > 1.
3.5.  Heterogeneity
It is plausible to suppose that individuals vary in their susceptibility to myopia.  Such
differences may be reflected in myopia per se (the level of ￿) as well as in their ability to employ
commitment strategies to offset the effects of myopia.  For simplicity, suppose that there are two
types of individuals, some myopic (to the same degree) and some not.
Such heterogeneity implies that there will be a tradeoff in determining the optimal tax
(subsidy) on capital.  Beginning with the case in which there are no labor supply effects, a small
capital subsidy will produce a first-order utility gain to the myopic but no first-order loss to the
nonmyopic.  As the subsidy rises, the extent of the gain to the former group will fall, and there
will be an increasing first-order loss to the latter.  Hence, the optimal subsidy would reflect a
balance between these considerations.
Labor supply has already been examined for individuals exhibiting consumption myopia. 
For those who do not, it is clear that there will be no first-order effect of a small degree of capital
subsidization on labor supply.  The reasoning parallels that in subsection 3.3 for myopic labor
supply by myopic consumers: Because the initial effect on reallocating consumption is second-
order, the return to labor is unchanged.  Hence, regarding a small capital subsidy, the only labor
supply effects will be attributable to myopic consumers with nonmyopic labor supply, so any
adjustment for labor supply effects would be weighted by their fraction in the population.
In a complete optimal income tax analysis, one would also have to take into account
distributive effects due to heterogeneity.  Specifically, nonmyopic individuals will, ceteris
paribus (for a given ability and earnings level) be better off than myopic individuals.
20  This2, no rigorous social welfare optimization is attempted.
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difference in well-being may seem to favor some redistribution from the nonmyopic to the
myopic, and since the former save more than the latter, capital taxation rather than subsidization
(or perhaps less subsidization than otherwise would be optimal) may be in order.  This difference
in utility levels is relevant, however, only to the extent that the social welfare function is strictly
concave.  For a utilitarian social welfare function (and, to a degree for others, short of maximin),
it is differences in marginal utilities of consumption between the nonmyopic and myopic that
count.
To determine how (actual) marginal utility depends on myopia (the level of ￿), we can
take the derivative of utility given by expression (1) with respect to lump-sum income g, making
use of expressions (20) and (21) for the ci’s (evaluated at ￿1 = ￿2 = 1) and make appropriate
substitutions:
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Next, we can differentiate with respect to ￿:





























To determine the partial derivatives of the ci’s, we can again make use of expressions (20) and
(21), which ultimately yields
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Finally, observe that the term in square brackets is simply ￿u/￿c1 from expression (3), nonmyopic
individuals’ first-order condition for allocating consumption.  Hence, we can write
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To interpret expression (34), note that when ￿ = 1, that is, when individuals are not
myopic, ￿u/￿c1 is their actual first-order condition, so the final term is zero.  For ￿ > 1, ￿u/￿c1 is
negative because c1 is already too high from the perspective of normative utility.  Therefore, the21Individuals also may differ in whether their labor supply is myopic, in which case
opposing labor supply effects would net to some extent, and in their preferences.
22Regarding the redistributive issue addressed in subsection 3.5, note that although
general (income-based) redistribution can be accomplished through forced savings, capital
taxation is distinctive in affecting the within-income-group distribution between myopic and
nonmyopic individuals.
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sign of the derivative in expression (34) is given by the sign of ￿￿1.  If ￿ < 1 (￿ > 1), myopic
individuals have a lower (higher) marginal utility of consumption, and on this account it would
be optimal to redistribute away from (toward) such individuals, reinforcing (undercutting) the
case for a capital subsidy.  The intuition is that, because myopic individuals make poorer use of
incremental consumption, their marginal utility tends to be lower, ceteris paribus; however, due
to the curvature of utility, the rise in marginal utility attributable to the resources that are
allocated to c2 exceeds the fall in marginal utility of resources allocated to c1, and when ￿ > 1 this
effect dominates the direct effect.
4.  Discussion
4.1.  Social Security versus Capital Subsidization
Consider the choice between the use of social security and capital subsidization as
remedies for myopia.  In the case in which all individuals suffer equally from myopia, the two
policies are quite similar.  Social security forces additional savings whereas capital subsidization
induces it.  One could compare regimes that were scaled so as to have the same effect on first-
period consumption, in which case the direct welfare effect with regard to improved consumption
reallocation would be the same.  Likewise, labor supply effects would be similar.  (Recall, for
example, the comparison of expressions (12) and (30) for the case of nonmyopic labor supply;
the signs of the effects are the same and the only difference in magnitude is due to scaling, which
is taken here to be equalized.)
The more important case involves heterogeneity, for example, the previously noted case
in which some individuals are (equally) myopic and others are not.
21  Social security, in the range
considered, improves consumption allocations for the former group (and has the aforementioned
effects on labor supply) and has no effect on the latter because the forced-savings constraint is
not binding for them.  By contrast, capital subsidization reduces first-period consumption of both
groups.  For the nonmyopic, this consequence is distortionary (once the subsidy becomes strictly
positive).  There would also be effects on labor supply, the direction depending on the curvature
of the utility function.
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It is also interesting to consider the combined use of social security and capital
subsidization.  As the social security constraint becomes tighter, capital subsidization would tend
to become less desirable: The favorable inducement for the myopic would become irrelevant, but
the distortion of the nonmyopic would remain.  Additionally, if capital subsidization were- 23 -
already employed, the effect of social security would be nil until the now-later point at which the
forced-savings constraint begins to bind.
4.2.  Liquidity Constraints
The possibility that some individuals are liquidity constrained, especially when young, is
relevant to the consideration of myopia, forced savings, and capital taxation.  See, for example,
Hubbard and Judd (1986, 1987).  Although liquidity constraints are moot in the present model
(because all lifetime income is received in the first of the two periods), they could emerge as
important in a natural extension with multiple years of work.
The effect of liquidity constraints on consumption misallocation depends on individuals’
true utility functions, their myopia, and the way liquidity constraints bind.  For the myopic,
liquidity constraints might increase utility by reducing the extent of overconsumption in early
years.  If liquidity constraints force consumption to be too low, however, social security’s forced-
savings constraint can only hurt, although it may not be binding on such individuals.  It would be
binding if earnings in early years were very low relative to lifetime income and borrowing was
impossible.  As a consequence, it may be desirable to defer forced-savings requirements until
individuals are at a stage at which earnings are greater and consumption needs are lower,
mirroring optimal retirement savings patterns of nonmyopic individuals.
Capital subsidization would not induce further reductions in early consumption of
liquidity-constrained individuals.  Indeed, capital taxes or subsidies – imposed as a function of
unearned income – would be irrelevant for individuals who neither borrow nor save (and who
would not be induced to do so by the tax or subsidy).  It would be possible to differentially tax
consumption in different periods (tax rates could depend on age); then higher taxes in early years
and lower taxes in later years would, through the mechanical effect described in subsection 3.2,
reduce early consumption, which would be detrimental for liquidity-constrained individuals.
The analysis of labor supply, the focus here, is affected by liquidity constraints in a
straightforward manner.  Regarding individuals for whom the constraints are binding, neither
social security nor capital subsidization affects consumption; hence, labor supply is unaffected as
well.  For individuals not bound by liquidity constraints, the effects of such policies on labor
supply are as analyzed previously.
5.  Conclusion
This article offers a preliminary analysis of the effects of social security and of capital
taxation on labor supply in a model in which individuals exhibit myopia in their allocation of
consumption over time.  The questions are important given the belief that myopia may
significantly influence individuals’ decision-making and that myopia has a central role in
justifying social security and policies toward the taxation of capital.  To focus on core issues, a
simple, two-period model with separable utility was employed, social security was taken to be- 24 -
actuarially fair, and capital taxation was adjusted in a manner that kept the overall level of
taxation constant.
The effect of social security on labor supply was seen to depend on the curvature of
individuals’ utility functions and also on whether or not labor supply decisions are myopic in the
same manner as consumption decisions are.  Interestingly, although the sign of labor supply
effects depends on the same parameters in each of the two cases regarding labor supply myopia,
the effects are reversed in the two cases on account of the fact that the desirability of social
security in reallocating consumption across periods is perceived in an opposite fashion. 
Furthermore, for myopic labor supply, the social security forced-savings constraint has no effect
at the margin when it just begins to bind, but for nonmyopic labor supply, the effect is first order
– although decreasing as the constraint becomes tighter.  In many respects, the social security
“tax” does not have the properties of a tax levied on top of a preexisting tax (here the labor
income tax), even though individuals’ myopia leads them to overweight the present, when the
social security tax is levied, relative to the future, when actuarially fair benefits are paid.
Capital taxation contributes to the distortion of consumption allocations due to myopia,
making capital subsidization appear attractive.  Raising capital taxation shifts taxation from the
present to the future in the present model (in which revenue raised at a given income level is held
constant).  In light of individuals’ myopia, one might expect capital taxation to be attractive on
this account, yet it does not reduce labor supply distortion in any straightforward manner. 
Instead, the effects of capital subsidization on labor supply are similar to those of social security
and thus depend on the curvature of individuals’ utility as well as on whether labor supply
decisions are myopic.
In both settings, results that may at first seem counterintuitive are explained in significant
part by the fact that, in the present model, even myopic individuals are assumed to engage in
optimization.  Their consumption allocations do not imply a preference for present consumption
at the margin because their myopia has already skewed consumption toward the present until the
point at which they are indifferent to marginal adjustments.  Social security’s forced-savings
requirement, as it begins to bind, and capital taxation each influence consumption allocations
beginning from that point.
This investigation suggests a number of avenues for further inquiry.  Most obviously, the
model could be extended in a number of ways; as section 4 notes, allowing additional periods of
labor supply, nonconstant wage profiles, and liquidity constraints would complicate the welfare
analysis, as does heterogeneity (briefly explored in subsection 3.5, with regard to capital
taxation).  In addition to comparing the welfare effects of social security and capital taxation
(subsidization) on myopic individuals, other policies such as the structure of retirement plans
could be examined.
Additionally, it is important to explore the implications of other behavioral assumptions. 
Bernheim (1994), Diamond (2004), and some others suggest that retirement savings may be
suboptimal because of the sheer complexity of retirement planning and individuals’ inexperience. 23One specific possibility is that some individuals underestimate and others overestimate
the benefits they will receive, in which case social security acts like a labor income tax on the
former and subsidy on the latter.  Some other possibilities are the subject of a sequel in progress,
tentatively entitled “Non-Optimizing Behavior, Social Security, and Labor Supply.”  Concerns
about misunderstanding of benefits motivate suggestions to provide clearer statements to
individuals of how their future benefits accrue as they work and also proposals to pre-fund social
security in the form of defined contribution plans.
24The labor supply effects of political uncertainty of the sort measured by Dominitz,
Manski, and Heinz (2003), concerning whether future benefits will be paid, would be quite
different.  Specifically, individuals might treat the perceived future deficiency as an additional
tax on labor supply and be induced to over-save.
25One might study, for example, whether the sort of behavior documented by Madrian and
Shea (2001) and Choi et al. (2004), wherein different default specifications for retirement plans
lead to substantial changes in savings behavior, has similar implications for labor supply as do
changes in social security.
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To analyze this problem, it would be necessary to define more precisely the structure of
individuals’ errors in order to examine the effects of social security, capital taxation, or other
policies on labor supply and welfare.
23  In this setting, it might be supposed that some individuals
would save too little and others would save too much; the latter may be unaffected by social
security but further distorted by capital subsidization.
It would also be instructive to introduce uncertainty regarding future earnings and health
status.  In addition to influencing the analysis of the labor supply effects of social security
retirement schemes and capital taxation, it would also be appropriate to investigate other forms
of social insurance, such as for unemployment and disability.  One might expect myopia to
operate similarly because these sorts of social insurance programs, like social security retirement
systems, tend to impose a present tax on earnings in order to finance future benefits, albeit state-
contingent ones.
24  Of course, additional features would be introduced as well.
Finally, the present analysis suggests some directions for empirical investigation.  Study
of the effects of taxation on labor supply sometimes treat social security taxation as cumulative
with explicit labor income taxation, whereas analytically they should have qualitatively different
effects.  Given that the payroll taxes that finance social security are of a similar order of
magnitude to labor income taxes, it is important to test whether and how their effects on labor
supply differ.  Moreover, the effects of both social security and capital taxation (subsidization)
depend on whether or not labor supply is myopic in the same fashion as is consumption.  This
subject, however, has not been substantially explored; empirical work on myopia has tended to
focus on ultimate intertemporal decisions such as savings rather than on intermediate decisions
like labor supply, the return to which depends on such subsequent choices.  Furthermore, the
results here assume that myopia takes a particular form (one consistent with quasi-hyperbolic
discounting, which has received some empirical support), but alternative consumption behavior
may have different implications for labor supply.
25- 26 -
Four points seem clear: Myopia and related behavior may be empirically significant; such
behavior is central to the analysis of social security and capital taxation, among other policies;
labor supply considerations are likewise consequential; and, finally, myopia has important
implications for labor supply.  Taken together, these factors suggest that additional research in
this area is warranted.- 27 -
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